Public Law: Louisiana Constitutional Law by Hargrave, Lee
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 37 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1975-1976 Term: A Symposium
Winter 1977
Public Law: Louisiana Constitutional Law
Lee Hargrave
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Lee Hargrave, Public Law: Louisiana Constitutional Law, 37 La. L. Rev. (1977)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol37/iss2/19




The foundations are being laid, albeit slowly, for implementation of
the state constitution's guarantee against excessive punishment. Article I,
Section 20 replaced the former constitutional prohibition against "cruel and
unusual punishment"' with a prohibition against "cruel, excessive or
unusual punishment." The change was a deliberate enlargement of the
guarantee, the committee comments indicating that" [t]he 1921 provision is
revised to include 'excessive' as well as cruel and unusual punish-
ments ...... 2 Additionally, Section 20 uses the disjunctive or to indicate
that three separate prohibitions are involved-prohibition of punishment
that is cruel, punishment that is unusual and punishment that is simply
excessive. This is a change from the prior conjunctive reference to cruel and
unusual punishment. The new formula, in the words of one of its drafters,
allows the courts to avoid strained interpretations of what is cruel and
unusual punishment, in order to reach the sometimes more important
question of whether the punishment does, in fact, fit the crime. For
example, it is much easier to find that imposition of the death penalty is
excessive as punishment for such crimes as rape and kidnapping than
that it is cruel or unusual. 3
Though the supreme court has yet to invoke Article I, Section 20 to
alter a sentence on the grounds of excessiveness, a number of concurring
opinions in the last term indicate a growing realization that the section does
require alteration of a sentence, even if within the statutory penalties for a
crime, if it is too severe in light of the circumstances surrounding the
offense.4 Justice Tate, concurring in State v. Bryant,5 objected to the death
* This commentary omits discussion of Edwards v. Parker, 332 So. 2d 175 (La.
1976) (use of tidelands moneys), and Williams v. Williams, 331 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976)
(alimony pendente lite not a denial of equal protection), as both cases are scheduled
to be discussed in student notes appearing later in this volume.
** Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
I. La. Const. art. I, § 12 (1921).
2. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1973 OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, July 6, 1973 at 4 [hereinafter cited as
JOURNAL].
3. Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 Loy. L. REV. 9, 39 (1975).
4. Review of the excessiveness of punishment is within the supreme court's
jurisdiction under Article V, Section 5(C) for it is review of a "question of law"
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penalty for aggravated rape in a case in which the defendant was a mentally
disturbed Vietnam veteran; he had just had a violent quarrel with his wife;
the penetration was brief and there was no emission and no brutality; the life
of the victim was not endangered; no force was used; and no unusual
psychological trauma was caused the victim.6 Justice Dixon in State v.
Fisher7 and State v. Pierce8 indicated that in a proper case with a proper
record the court "must review excessiveness." 9 Justice Calogero in State v.
McClinton,"° State v. Whitehurst" and State v. Victorian12 noted that
"[t]he addition of the word 'excessive' possibly adds a new dimension to
the constitutional prohibition."' 3 However, Justice Marcus expressed the
view that the addition of the term "excessive" in Section 20 does not
change the constitutional guarantee."
Any doubts that review of sentences is a proper role, indeed a required
role, for the supreme court are removed by the 1976 capital punishment
statutes which require the supreme court to "review every sentence of death
to determine if it is excessive. The court by rules shall establish such
procedures as are necessary to satisfy constitutional criteria for review."15
Review of sentences for excessiveness and consistency in capital cases
may also be required by federal constitutional standards. A number of the
opinions in the recent capital punishment cases indicate that state statutes
providing for capital punishment were held constitutional in part because
appellate review of sentences was required as a means of ensuring that
capital punishment was applied in a uniform fashion instead of in a
haphazard and inconsistent manner. 16
rather than a "question of fact." Article I, Section 20 itself makes excessiveness of a
sentence a question of constitutional law requiring review of the circumstances of the
offense and the character of the defendant to determine if the sentence is excessive.
This is not a review as to whether a certain fact occurred or not, but review as to
appropriateness of sentence based on unquestioned facts.
5. 325 So. 2d 255 (La. 1976) (Tate, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 266.
7. 321 So. 2d 519 (La. 1975).
8. 321 So. 2d 523 (La. 1975).
9. 321 So. 2d 519, 520 (La. 1975) (Dixon, J., concurring).
10. 329 So. 2d 676 (La. 1975).
11. 319 So. 2d 907 (La. 1975) (Calogero, J., concurring).
12. 332 So. 2d 220 (La. 1976).
13. State v. McClinton, 329 So. 2d 676, 677 (La. 1976).
14. Id. at 678 (Marcus, J., concurring).
15. La. Acts 1976, No. 694, adding LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.9. See The Work
of the Louisiana Legislature forthe 1976RegularSession-Criminal TrialProcedure,
37 LA. L. REV. 195, 197 (1976).
16. Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2966 (1976), quoting State v. Dixon, 283
So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973); Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2959 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia,
96 S. Ct. 2909, 2923, 2937 (1976).
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The review of death sentences apparently required by the United States
Supreme Court and clearly required by state law is basically the same type of
review that is required by Section 20 for all sentences. Standards for
determining excessiveness can be formulated from the considerations in
Bryant mentioned earlier, the new state legislation,' 7 the Model Penal
Code, 8 and the draft proposal for a federal criminal code.' 9
FREE SPEECH
Economy Carpets Manufacturers & Distributors v. Better Business
Bureau20 is an important and unanimous reaffirmation by the supreme court
of the free speech guarantee of the state and federal constitutions. Plaintiff
who had been the subject of reports published by the BBB critical of his
advertising and his business methods, sued the bureau for treble damages
alleging a conspiracy in restraint of trade and requested a jury trial. Before
and after filing suit, plaintiff stationed portable signs critical of the bureau
and of the judge at his place of business in suburban Baton Rouge and in the
downtown area across the street from the bureau's office. 21 The district
court ordered plaintiff "to cease and desist from using signs or any public
advertisements to call attention to this litigation and prohibiting defendant
from calling attention to this litigation by means of any public advertise-
ments or private publications."22 Relying on federal and state constitutional
grounds, the supreme court held the protective order was improperly issued
and ordered it annulled.
While Cox v. Louisiana23 and Adderley v. Florida24 permit controls
In a petition for a rehearing, the state took the position that Roberts v. Louisia-
na, 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976), holding the state's capital punishment regime unconstitu-
tional, should be reconsidered in light of the 1974 constitution providing for appellate
review of sentences in Article I, Section 20.
17. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 905.4-.5 (added by La. Acts 1976, No. 694).
18. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 7.01-05; 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
19. Proposed Federal Criminal Code, Final Report of the National Commission
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Title 18, Sec. 3604; Title 28, Section 1291.
20. 330 So. 2d 301 (La. 1976).
21. The signs displayed the following pithy messages:
"CHARLIE TAPP OF CONSUMER PROTECTION IS A LIAR WHO SUCKS UP
WITH THE B.B.B."; "THE BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU SHAFTS YOU &
THE SMALL BUSINESSMAN TOO!"; "BILLY GUSTE DOESN'T HAVE THE
BALLS TO INVESTIGATE HIS DARLINGS, CHARLIE TAPP & THE B.B.B.;"
"THE BBB IS THE WORST BUNKO OPERATIONS OF THEM ALL;- "A
VOTE FOR JUDGE SHORTESS IS A VOTE AGAINST FREEDOM OF
SPEECH."
22. 330 So. 2d 301, 303 (La. 1976).
23. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
24. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
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on demonstrations near a courthouse because of the threat to court opera-
tions, the instant case involved signs rather than demonstrations and the
signs were not in the proximity of the courthouse. Though one might
categorize the signs as "commercial speech," the supreme court has clearly
abandoned the doctrine that commercial speech is entitled to less protection
than non-commercial expression of ideas. 25
Thus, the central issue was application of Wood v. Georgia2 6 and its
standard that prior restraint on expression is permitted only if the danger the
expression poses to court proceedings is "an imminent, not merely a likely
threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or
even probable; it must immediately imperil." '27 Focusing on what is
essentially a factual evaluation of the hazard posed by the speech involved,
the court determined that the circumstances were not sufficient to justify the
prior restraint. That result is impelled by the federal standards in the area.
While statements in a number of decisions indicate that prior restraint
might be justified in grave situations, such grave situations seem impossible
to find. The refusal of the court to apply prior restraint in the Pentagon
Papers case2" involving a possible threat to national security is one recent
indication that the burden of justification may be insurmountable. Subse-
quent to the instant case, the United States Supreme Court, in Nebraska
Press Ass'n. v. Stuart,29 held unconstitutional a pre-trial protective order
restraining the press from reporting, with respect to an upcoming criminal
trial, matters relating to the existence of a confession made by the accused or
other facts "strongly implicative" of the accused. The lower court's
justification for the order in Stuart, as in the instant case, was primarily to
prevent publicity that might prevent the court from impaneling an impartial
jury. But the Supreme Court pointed out that pretrial publicity does not
inevitably lead to an unfair trial;3 0 the impact of such publicity is necessarily
speculative;3 alternative measures short of prior restraint were available; 32
and the order was too vague and broad. 33 In fact, four members of the court
25. 370 U.S. 375, 385 (1962), quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947).
26. Id. at 375.
27. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S.
Ct. 1817 (1976) (drug price advertisements); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)
(abortion advertising).
28. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
29. 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976).
30. Id. at 2800.
31. Id. at 2804.
32. Id. at 2805.
33. Id. at 2807.
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in concurring opinions indicated that such orders may never be justifiable.34
The same considerations would apply to Economy Carpets; indeed the
facts in that case are not as extreme as in Stuart. In a civil action, the sixth
amendment impartial jury considerations are not as strong as in a criminal
case. Stuart involved a brutal murder of six people in a rural town of 850
persons where the public interest was much greater than it would be in a civil
action in a large city like Baton Rouge. Though the instant case involved
expression by a litigant rather than by newspapers, the first amendment
protection is the same for individuals as for the press;35 Wood v. Georgia
itself involved expression by a sheriff interested in a grand jury investigation
rather than actions by disinterested third persons or reporters. 36
Further, the instant case was concerned with prior restraint on expres-
sion, where the prohibitions of the first amendment are strongest. Some
post-publication remedies might be proper under a strong factual showing
that a party plaintiff engaged in conduct directed toward prejudicing the
result of a trial or disrupting the legal process. 37 If, for example, the extreme
actions of a litigant make it impossible to impanel an impartial jury, a judge
trial might be ordered, the suit delayed, or a plaintiff's suit dismissed.3 8
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION: STATE ACTION
In Flint v. St. Augustine High School,39 two students contested their
expulsion from a private high school for violating the school's smoking
regulations. The district court enjoined the expulsions and ordered the
students reinstated, on due process and equal protection grounds. 4° The
34. Id. at 2808, 2809.
35. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972): "It has generally been
held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right to
special access to information not available to the public generally."
36. In Wood, a judge of the superior court charged the grand jury to investigate
"an inane and inexplicable pattern of Negro bloc voting." The charge was given
during a local political campaign. The sheriff responded with a statement critical of
the judge's actions saying among other things, "[i]f anyone in the community
[should] be free of racial prejudice, it should be our Judges. It is shocking to find a
Judge charging a Grand Jury in the style and language of a race baiting candidate for
political office." The sheriff also delivered to the court bailiff who delivered to
members of the grand jury an open letter to the grand jury.
37. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 584 (1965) (Black, J., concurring & dissent-
ing): "But the history of the past 25 years if it shows nothing else shows that his
group's constitutional and statutory rights have to be protected by the courts, which
must be kept free from intimidation and coercive pressures of any kind."
38. See In re Anderson, 306 F. Supp. 712 (D.D.C. 1969).
39. 323 So. 2d 229 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 325 So. 2d 271 (La.
1976).
40. Id. at 234: "it can hardly be said that the expulsion penalty for repeated
[Vol. 37
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court of appeal reversed and allowed the expulsions to stand, resting its
decision on the view that the procedures accompanying the expulsions did
not offend due process. 41 The majority opinion is questionable in accepting
the view that the due process guarantee applies to expulsion of students by
private schools. The concurring opinion correctly points out that due
process limitations apply only to state action and not to private action.
Clearly, the federal due process and equal protection guarantees
protect only against government action and the expansion of the state action
concept has not been extended to include private schools. 42 The prospect of
expanding the concepts to private schools is unlikely, for the doctrine that
private persons pursuing "public functions" constitutes state action has
been checked,4 3 as has the view that state licensing and regulation of a
private activity makes that activity state action. 44
The state due process guarantee is also a constraint on state action that
does not apply to private conduct. Article I, Section 2 in providing, "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process
of law," continues language from the 1921 Constitution which was under-
stood to apply only to state action.45 The committee debates on the section
indicate the Bill of Rights Committee worked from the background of
federal principles which apply the guarantee only to state action. 46 The
reference to "due process of law" and the reference to "equal protection of
the laws" emphasize the relationship to laws, which only government can
smoking violations has been uniformly applied after due notice to the students of the
intention on the part of the school to begin enforcing it."
"A written rule which, to the knowledge of students and faculty, has never been
enforced over a period of many years is not a rule at all."
41. Id. at 235: "there were here present such necessary minimum safeguards as
were required to take the actions of dismissal out of the ambit of being arbitrary or
capricious or without probable cause."
42. See Note, 60 VA. L. REV. 840 (1974). Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975),
dealt with suspension from a public school and did not reach the question of private
action. Private school racial discrimination is prohibited by the thirteenth amend-
ment, which by its terms reaches private conduct.
43. Hudgens v. NLRB, 96 S. Ct. 1029 (1976), overruling Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1%8), and
limiting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345 (1974) (privately owned utility).
44. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
45. See Vangraff, Inc. v. McClearley, 314 So. 2d 483, 485 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 So. 2d 549 (La. 1975): "Of course the above restrictions refer to
state action as opposed to private or personal action."
46. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
35 LA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1975). STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1973 VERBATIM TRANSCRwrs Aug. 29, 1973 at 60 [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
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adopt. When private action was to be reached, as in Article I, Section 12,
reference to the "laws" formula was clearly avoided. If action is to be taken
to regulate student dismissals by private schools, it must come from
legislation, for the constitution does not reach such activity.
DONATION OF STATE PROPERTY
Morial v. Orleans Parish School Board47 sustained the payment of
wages to a teacher for days she did not work because of illness48 against an
attack that such payment "of any salary without corresponding work is
actually a gift from a state subdivision to a private person" 49 in violation of
the 1921 Constitutional provision that the "funds, credit, property or things
of value of. . .any political corporation. . . shall not be loaned, pledged
or granted to or for any person .... "5 Givens Jewelers of Bossier, Inc. v.
Rich"' sustained the action of a school board in allowing jewelry salesmen
to sell class rings to students at the parish schools against a similar attack,
the plaintiffs there arguing that use of school premises by salesmen was a
loan or grant of governmental funds.
Both decisions are a common sense application of a provision that if
strictly construed would prevent much of what a modern state is expected to
do for its citizens. The 1974 Constitution continues language similar to that
of the 1921 Constitution, but adds a further provision liberalizing the rule:
"For a public purpose, the state and its political subdivisions or
political corporations may engage in cooperative endeavors with each
other, with the United States or its agencies, or with any public or
private association, corporation, or individual." 52
Under the new provision, the question hinges on whether a grant or payment
is for a "public purpose," a question "left to interpretation by the judiciary
so that there is sufficient flexibility for a lasting and workable document." 53
The traditional construction of public purpose has of course been quite
broad.
47. 332 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
48. The payment was provided for under LA. R.S. 17:1201-02 (1950).
49. 332 So. 2d at 505.
50. La. Const. art. IV, § 12 (1921).
51. 313 So. 2d 913 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
52. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 14(c).
53. JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 47 (comments to the committee proposal). Though
some changes were made in the committee proposal, the convention continued the
language of the proposal which became subsection c. PROCEEDINGS, Dec. 17, 1973 at
79-82.
[Vol. 37
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PROHIBITIONS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The supreme court determined in State v. Suire54 that a municipality
could define by ordinance the offense of aggravated battery and punish a
violator for such conduct even though state criminal law contains an almost
identical offense." The court then held that a person convicted under such
an ordinance could not be tried under the state aggravated battery statute for
the same conduct in light of established double jeopardy principles.5 6 The
effect in the instant case was that a defendant sentenced to pay a $50 fine and
to a suspended 30-day jail term under the local conviction could not be tried
for the state felony punishable by 10 years imprisonment at hard labor.
Though Suire is a routine application of the 1921 Constitution, it raises
an important question as to the construction of Article VI, Section 9(A)(1)
of the 1974 Constitution which introduces the new limitation that a local
governmental subdivision cannot "define and provide for punishment of a
felony. . . ." Concurring in Suire, Justice Tate pointed out that the new
limitation is subject to two constructions: (1) "to limit the power of
municipalities to impose punishment at hard labor" 57 or (2) "to exempt
from local regulation any conduct which the state legislation punishes as a
felony. "
If one takes the first approach and concludes that Section 9 simply
prohibits penalties at hard labor, thus allowing municipalities to prohibit
any conduct, the result is the possibility, as in Suire, of local prosecutions
effectively barring subsequent state prosecutions for the same conduct. This
can frustrate the state's policy of providing serious penalties for what the
legislature has determined are the more serious crimes. The second ap-
proach would prohibit local governmental subdivisions from any punish-
ment of conduct that state law defines as a felony.
The constitutional convention debate on Section 9 divulges little more
than that the provision is "standard in this type of approach. . .," but the
committee comments to the proposal indicate the sources of the limitation
54. 319 So. 2d 347 (La. 1975).
55. See LA. R.S. 14:34 (1950): "Aggravated battery is a battery committed with a
dangerous weapon."
56. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970). Cf. State v. Didier, 262 La. 364, 263
So. 2d 322 (1972); Note, 33 LA. L. REV. 474 (1973).
57. 319 So. 2d at 351.
58. Id.
59. Delegate Lanier speaking for the Committee on Local and Parochial Govern-
ment said simply, "The prohibition against the defining and providing for the
punishment of a felony is a standard in this type of approach. PROCEEDINGS,
Sept. 26, 1973 at 51.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
are the Model State Constitution and the Illinois Constitution. 60
The exact language is found in the model constitution, and can be
traced to Jefferson B. Fordham's 1953 draft of model provisions. Ford-
ham's comment to the provision was, "[a] city should have the power to
define and provide for the punishment of offenses within its governmental
purview. It has been considered desirable to make it clear that this power
stops short of serious offenses which fall in the felony category." 6 1 The
reference to serious offenses, as opposed to serious punishments, focuses
on the conduct or offense involved, rather than on the penalty, lending some
weight to the view that the provision is directed to preventing cities from
legislating at all against serious conduct which the state defines as felonious.
If a city's "governmental purview" "stops short," it would seem that the
city has no power to punish conduct even with a minor penalty when the
state punishes with a serious penalty.
Identical language also appears in Article VII, Section 6(d) of the
Illinois Constitution, which provides that a home rule unit cannot "define
and provide for the punishment of a felony." The Illinois constitution goes
further, and contains in Section 6(e) a prohibition the Louisiana constitution
does not contain, a provision that a home rule unit cannot "punish by
imprisonment for more than six months" absent a law empowering such
action. Section 6(e) focuses on the type of punishment involved while
Section 6(d) emphasizes the type of offense. It would seem that since
Louisiana adopts Section 6(d) and not 6(e) that the choice was made to focus
on the type of conduct rather than the type of penalty involved.
Both the source provisions would then indicate that the Louisiana
provision should be construed to prohibit municipalities from penalizing
conduct which the state defines as a felony. This is consistent with the word
choice of the constitution. If the purpose were simply to prevent local
governments from providing penalties of imprisonment at hard labor, one
would have expected reference to punishment or a type of punishment. But
the constitution does more than refer to punishment alone; it also refers to
defining a felony. Since most municipal crimes are minor ones which are
not state felonies, the ultimate impact on local government of the provision
will be small.
The best argument to be made for the power of local government in this
regard would be that the constitution must be construed in favor of local
60. JOURNAL, July 6, 1973 at 23 where it is stated: "For a similar provision, see
the Illinois Constitution art. VII, § 6(d) and Model State Constitutions (sic), Sixth
Edition (Revised), art. VIII, § 8.02 (1968)."
61. J. FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 82 (1975).
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governmental powers. However, this approach conflicts with the conven-
tion's action defeating a proposal providing for such a liberal construction.
62
Justice Tate in his concurrence in Suire suggested a legislative solution
to the problem:
For instance, the legislature might either deny local governments
the power to enact police regulations punishing conduct which the state
punishes as a felony; or else it might confirm the concurrent police
power of the state and local government in such instances .... 63
The first legislative solution mentioned by Justice Tate would present no
constitutional problems, for Article VI, Section 7 provides that local units
may exercise any power "not denied by its charter or by general
law..... " Legislation prohibiting municipalities from penalizing conduct
which the state defines as a felony would be a general law denying that
power to local governments. However, the second suggested solution
would be unconstitutional if Section 9 were properly construed to prohibit
municipalities from penalizing conduct that the state defines as a felony.
Perhaps the ultimate question must rest on the possibility of serious
abuse of local prosecutions in light of the double jeopardy principles that
prevent state trial for conduct which a local government unit has already
punished. On the other hand, if municipalities are prohibited from penaliz-
ing conduct the state defines as a felony, this would be no great limitation on
the action of municipalities and would not infringe greatly on local govern-
ment prerogatives as they are currently exercised.
PARDON; VOTING RIGHTS: RESTORATION OF RIGHTS
The 1921 Constitution made a direct grant of the pardoning power to
the governor, 64 including the power to commute sentences, 65 which was
construed as a prohibition against the legislature limiting the chief execu-
tive's power to pardon. 6' Accordingly, statutes establishing mandatory
criminal penalties without commutation of sentence were held to be
unconstitutional. 67 However, since suspension of sentence, parole and
62. JOURNAL, Sept. 25, 1973 at 4. The convention deleted from the committee
proposal a section which provided, "Powers and functions of local governmental
subdivisions shall be construed liberally in favor of such local governmental
subdivisions."
63. 319 So. 2d 347, 351 (La. 1975).
64. La. Const. art. V, § 10 (1921).
65. See State v. Rose, 29 La. Ann. 755 (1877).
66. State v. Lee, 171 La. 744, 132 So. 219 (1931).
67. State v. Ramsey, 292 So. 2d 708 (La. 1974); State v. Varice, 292 So. 2d 703
(La. 1974).
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probation are creatures of statute rather than constitution, mandatory
sentences withholding those benefits were permissible.
The 1974 Constitution, Article IV, Section 5 continues the direct grant
of the pardoning power to the governor:
The governor may grant reprieves to persons convicted of of-
fenses against the state and, upon recommendation of the Board of
Pardons, may commute sentences, pardon those convicted of offenses
against the state, and remit fines and forfeitures for such offenses.
The Article does not otherwise limit his exercise of that power. In fact, the
convention defeated two amendments that sought to subject the governor's
power to limitations by law.6 8 Thus, under the new constitution, the
legislature cannot infringe on this direct grant of power and cannot provide
for sentences without commutation or pardon. State v. Smith69 and State v.
Chase70 take this view and continue the jurisprudence developed under the
prior constitution.
An innovation of the 1974 constitution is the broadening of the right of
convicted felons to vote. Article I, Section 10 establishes the right of every
18-year old citizen to vote, "except that this right may be suspended while a
person is. . .under an order of imprisonment for conviction of a felony. "
Fox v. Municipal Democratic Executive Committee7' applied the section in
an action contesting the candidacy for mayor of Monroe of a man who had
been convicted of attempted public contract fraud and sentenced to pay a
fine and to serve ten months in the parish jail, the jail sentence being
suspended and the defendant being placed on probation for one year.
Fulfillment of the requirement that the candidate be a "qualified elector"
hinged on the candidate's right to vote under Section 10. The court of appeal
decided the candidate was eligible to vote and thus was qualified to be a
candidate. The opinion reaches the correct result, but not by the strongest
rationale.
The court emphasized the language, the right to vote may be sus-
pended, determining that the phrase is "permissive and not self-operative,
meaning that it must be implemented before it can operate to deprive one of
his right to vote.... .- 72 The legislature had not taken advantage of the
grant of power to suspend the right since it had enacted no law to so provide
since the adoption of the 1974 constitution. The court decided that the laws
68. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 3, 1973 at 106-23; id., Aug. 4, 1973 at 8-19.
69. 327 So. 2d 355 (La. 1976).
70. 329 So. 2d 434 (La. 1976).
71. 328 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
72. Id. at 174.
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existing before the adoption of the new constitution which had totally
disfranchised convicted felons73 were invalidated by the 1974 constitution
because of conflict with Article I, Section 10, 74 and thus, no law existed to
suspend the right to vote while one is under an order of imprisonment. The
court should have recognized that the prior statutes were invalidated only to
the extent that they conflicted with the new constitution, and that to the
extent they did not, they would remain effective. Those statutes could be
applied in instances in which no conflict with Section 10 exists, i.e., in
those instances in which Section 10 does grant the power to suspend the
right to vote .
75
Even so, the decision reaches the correct result, for under Section 10,
the legislative grant allows suspension of the right only during the time a
person is "under an order of imprisonment for conviction of a felony." The
defendant in Fox was not under an order of imprisonment, as required under
Section 10,76 for his sentence of imprisonment in the parish jail was
suspended.
Though the 1976 legislature has acted to provide for suspension of the
right to vote while a person "is under an order of imprisonment for
conviction of a felony, ' 77 the result in the instant case would remain the
same, for the defendant was not imprisoned and would thus still have the
right to vote.
In Article IV, Section 5(E), the constitution itself grants an automatic
pardon upon completion of sentence to "a first offender never previously
73. LA. R.S. 18:42, 111 (1950). Id. 18:270.210 (1950), as amended by La. Acts
1970, No. 517, § 1.
74. La. Const. art. XIV, § 18 provides that prior laws not in conflict with the 1974
constitution "shall remain in effect," but that "[liaws which are in conflict with this
constitution shall cease upon its effective date."
75. 1974-75 LA. Op. ATr'y GEN. 147, 149 (May 2, 1975).
76. Declaration of Rights, supra note 46, at 34. Attorney General opinion 75-131,
note 75, supra, is to the same effect in determining that persons on probation or under
a suspended sentence cannot be deprived of the right to vote. The opinion is on
questionable grounds, however, when it determines that persons on parole can be
deprived of the right. This aspect of the opinion reversed and recalled an earlier
opinion to the contrary. The error of the opinion is its reliance on a non-related
section, Article I, Section 20, which refers to rights of citizenship being restored upon
termination of "supervision following conviction for any offense," and in its
determination that a person on parole is under an order of imprisonment. The opinion
argues that a person on parole is in the "legal custody" of the institution from which
paroled and thus "under an order of imprisonment." If a person is released from
prison, he is under no order of imprisonment; he is under an order of release. The
fiction of "legal custody" is not in any sense imprisonment.
77. La. Acts 1976, No. 697, adopting LA. R.S. 18:102 (Supp. 1976).
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convicted of a felony" without the necessity of action by the Board of
Pardons or by the governor. The effect of such an automatic pardon should
be the same as that of a regular pardon by the governor. The constitution
makes no distinction between the effects of the two; the debate discloses no
difference in effect was contemplated; 78 the two are handled in the same
subsection; and the automatic pardon is a continuation and extension of a
1968 constitutional amendment that recognized that a first offender would
be "eligible for pardon automatically upon completion of his sentence
without the aforementioned recommendation in writing" 79 without distin-
guishing the effect of such a pardon from a regular pardon.
The effect of a pardon, under prior jurisprudence, is to erase all
consequences of a conviction; "it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as
if he had never committed the offense. . . .If granted after conviction, it
removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores to him all his civil
rights; . . .""It would follow that a person granted a pardon, automatic
or otherwise, would not be disqualified from obtaining a liquor license
because of conviciion for an offense that was pardoned.
81
But it was recognized in Williams v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic
Beverages82 that the automatic pardon provision was inapplicable as to
persons whose sentences were completed prior to the effective date of the
78. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 3, 1973 at 92-123; id., Aug. 4, 1973 at 2-43.
79. La. Const. art. V, § 10 (1921) (as amended by Act 662 of 1968). Before the
amendment, Section 10 simply provided a pardon procedure without distinguishing
between first or multiple offenders by which the governor could not pardon without
recommendation by the lieutenant governor, attorney general and presiding judge of
the court in which the conviction was returned, or at least the recommendation of two
of the officials. The 1968 amendment allowed the governor to pardon first offenders
without recommendation of these officials. The 1974 constitution continues the
process and grants the pardon without the necessity of gubernatorial action.
80. State v. Lee, 171 La. 744, 132 So. 219, 220 (1931), quoting from Ex Parte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,380 (1866); Collins v. Lewis, I I I La. 693, 35 So. 816,
817 (1904). See Miller, The Declaration of Rights:Criminal Provisions, 21 Loy. L.
REV. 43, 49 (1975).
The state's position with respect to the broad effect of a pardon is the minority
view and would seem subject to re-examination. The constitution itself does not
provide the effect of any pardon, and the existing rule of the case law does not seem
to be constitutionally impelled. See Miller, supra ; see also the extensive discussion in
Note, 23 VAND. L. REV. 939, 1143-54 (1970).
81. See 1974-75 LA. Op. ATrr'y GEN. 166 (April 4, 1975); 1952-54 LA. Op. ATr'Y
GEN. 105 (December 17, 1952).
82. 317 So. 2d 247 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
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1974 constitution.8 3 However, it will be applicable to sentences completed
after December 31, 1974.84
Williams in dictum also construed Article I, Section 20 which restores
to a convicted person, first offender or not, "full rights of citizenship"
"upon termination of state and federal supervision following conviction for
any offense." In determining that the section would not preclude denial of a
liquor license to a convicted person, the court relied on the development of
the provision in the constitutional convention, particularly the deliberate
change from "full rights" to "full rights of citizenship" in a debate in
which the author of the amendment proposing the change indicated that the
section as changed would not prevent legislation restricting the issuance of
liquor licenses to persons who had been convicted of an offense. 85
83. See LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 26.
84. Id. art. XIV, § 35.
85. PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 8, 1973 at 57-62.
